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INTRODUCTION 
When hunted, the ostrich is said to run a certain distance and then 
thrust its head into the sand, thinking, because it cannot see, that it 
cannot be seen by the hunters.1 Legal parlance therefore refers to the 
"ostrich instruction," used when a defendant acts with the awareness 
of a high probability of the existence of an incriminating fact, but re­
mains deliberately ignorant as to whether the fact actually exists, 
hoping his ignorance will maintain his innocence.2 The defendant is 
like the ostrich - he thinks that if he does not actually see the facts, 
even though he knows they are there, he will maintain his innocence. 
1. E. COBHAM BREWER, DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE (1898). 
2. See Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728 (1899). In Spurr, the defendant was charged 
with knowingly certifying some checks drawn on a bank that was unable to cover them. The 
Court said: "And so evil design may be presumed if the officer purposely keeps himself in 
ignorance of whether the drawer has money in the bank or not, or is grossly indifferent to his 
duty in respect to the ascertainment of that fact." Id. at 735. 
473 
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The ostrich instruction allows the jury to equate deliberate igno­
rance3 with knowledge of a particular fact for the purpose of estab­
lishing the requisite mens rea for a crime, particularly in the context of 
conspiracy cases.4 Mens Rea is defined as "[a]n element of a criminal 
responsibility: a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal 
intent. Guilty Knowledge and wilfulness."5 A person's criminal culpa­
bility requires a showing that he acted purposely, knowingly, reck­
lessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each ma­
terial element of the offense. 
The Model Penal Code says a person acts purposely with respect 
to an element of a crime: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result 
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of 
that nature or to cause such a result; and 
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware 
of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or 
hopes that they exist.6 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an 
offense: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the atten­
dant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that 
nature or that such circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that 
it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a re­
sult.7 
A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result 
from his conduct.8 A person acts negligently when he should be aware 
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists 
or will result from his conduct.9 
In Spurr v. United States1°, the Supreme Court said that to act with 
deliberate ignorance is to act with the awareness of a high probability 
of the existence of the fact in question. The Court said that the jury 
3. Other terms for "deliberate ignorance" include "conscious avoidance" and "willful 
blindness." 
4. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985). In adopting this approach, the Model Penal 
Code followed a common law tradition of equating deliberate avoidance of knowledge with 
actual knowledge. See Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a 
Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 196-203 (1990). 
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990). 
6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a). 
7. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b). 
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). 
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d). 
10. 174 U.S. 728 (1899). 
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may infer knowledge of a certain fact if the defendant intentionally 
keeps himself in the dark about that fact.11In1969, the Supreme Court 
formally adopted a variation of the definition of knowledge based on 
deliberate ignorance in Leary v. United States.12 By 1970, many courts 
had followed this lead and acknowledged the validity of equating de­
liberate ignorance with guilty knowledge.13 Whether deliberate igno­
rance can satisfy the mens rea of knowledge, and if so, when the use of 
deliberate ignorance is appropriate in conspiracy cases is a hotly de­
bated topic.14 
The Supreme Court has approved of and been guided by the 
Model Penal Code's definitions of knowledge and deliberate igno­
rance, despite the fact that the Model Penal Code is not considered 
binding authority. The Model Penal Code says that "[w]hen knowl­
edge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, 
such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability 
of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist. "15 In 
Leary, the Court formally approved the Model Penal Code's defini­
tion of knowledge. Subsequently, each of the federal circuits has 
adopted this definition,16 indicating the general reliance on the Model 
Penal Code as a source of authority. 
Model Penal Code commentaries of section 2.02 provide that a 
prosecutor can establish the defendant's knowledge of the existence of 
particular fact without establishing positive knowledge17 if the prose­
cutor can establish that the defendant is aware of a high probability of 
its existence, without the defendant's believing that it actually does not 
exist.18 The Commentaries explain that the subsection of the Model 
11 .  Spurr, 174 U.S. at 735 ("[A]n evil design may be presumed if the officer purposely 
keeps himself in ignorance of whether the drawer has money in the bank or not."). 
12. 395 U.S. 6 (1969). In Leary, the defendant appealed his conviction for knowingly 
transporting illegally imported marijuana. He claimed the statute included an unconstitu­
tional presumption he knew marijuana was imported. The Court employed the Model Penal 
Code section 2.02(7)'s definition of knowledge to invalidate the presumption that the defen­
dant knew the marijuana was imported. 
13. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 203. 
14. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the Model Penal Code's definitional scheme of levels of 
culpability leads to the conclusion that deliberate ignorance substitutes recklessness, not 
knowledge); Jonathan L. Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 
YALE L.J. 2231 (1993) (arguing that courts such as the Second Circuit that use deliberate 
ignorance as a substitute for knowledge in limited circumstances have interpreted the defini­
tion of deliberate ignorance too loosely). 
15. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(7) (1985). 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th 
Cir. 1976); United States v. Olivares-Vega, 495 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1974). 
17. Positive knowledge is contrasted with imputed or inferred knowledge of a fact. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY. 873 (6th ed. 1990). 
18. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2)(b)(i), 2.02(7) (Official Draft, review and commen­
taries); see also Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge & the 
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Penal Code's definition of knowledge is designed to deal with the 
phenomenon of deliberate ignorance where a defendant is aware of 
the probable existence of a material fact, but chooses not to determine 
whether it exists or not.19 
The Ninth Circuit first gave deliberate ignorance extensive treat­
ment in United States v. Jewell.20 In Jewell, neither party contested the 
fact that the appellant entered the United States driving an automo­
bile in which 110 pounds of marijuana worth $6,250 had been con­
cealed in a secret compartment between the trunk and rear seat.21 The 
issue was whether the appellant possessed the requisite mens rea to be 
convicted.22 There was circumstantial evidence from which the jury 
could infer that the appellant had positive knowledge of the presence 
of the marijuana, and that his testimony to the contrary was false.23 On 
the other hand, there was evidence from which the jury could con­
clude that the appellant was truthful when he said that although he 
knew of the secret compartment and knew of facts indicating it con­
tained marijuana, he deliberately avoided positive knowledge of the 
presence of the contraband to avoid responsibility in the event of dis­
covery.24 If the jury concluded the latter was indeed the situation, and 
if positive knowledge was required to convict, the jury had no choice 
but to find appellant not guilty even though he deliberately contrived 
his lack of positive knowledge.25 
In Jewell, the Ninth Circuit allowed a deliberate ignorance instruc­
tion. The court concluded that the government may fulfill its burden 
of proof by proving that if the defendant was not actually aware that 
there was marijuana in the vehicle he was driving, his ignorance in that 
regard was solely a result of his conscious decision to avoid the truth.26 
"Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 
1994 WIS. L.REV. 29, 36. 
19. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(b)(i), 2.02(7) (Official Draft, review and commen-
taries). 
20. See 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane); Marcus, supra note 14, at 2232. 
21. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 698. 
22. The appellant, convicted of violating the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 1970, testified that he did not know the marijuana was present, explain­
ing that he had been paid $100 by a stranger to drive the car into the country, and that he 
was not actually aware that it contained contraband. See Jewell, 532 F.2d at 699 n.l. 
23. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 698-99. 
24. Id. at 699. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 700. The Ninth Circuit found firm support for this instruction in the work of 
legal commentators, such as Professor Rollin M. Perkins, who wrote: 
One with a deliberate antisocial purpose in mind ... may deliberately 'shut his eyes' toavoid 
knowing what would otherwise be obvious to view. In such cases, so far as criminal law is 
concerned, the person acts at his peril in this regard and is treated as having 'knowledge' of 
the facts as they are ultimately discovered to be. 
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The case provided one of the most comprehensive discussions of de­
liberate ignorance in the history of the circuit courts' dealing with the 
topic.27 The Jewell court justified its allowance of a deliberate igno­
rance instruction by arguing that one who is deliberately ignorant is as 
culpable as one who possesses positive knowledge, and that acting 
knowingly necessarily includes acting with an awareness of the high 
probability of the existence of the fact in question.28 
The relationship between deliberate ignorance and the mens rea 
requirements of a conspiracy charge became a source of confusion and 
disagreement among lower courts. Following Jewell, courts took vari­
ous approaches to the application of the deliberate ignorance instruc­
tion and accompanying evidentiary requirements in conspiracy cases.29 
As confusion mounted, many critics and courts turned to the Model 
Penal Code and its mens rea requirements for guidance.30 Most com­
mentators agree that the mens rea for conspiracy is purpose, or a spe­
cific desire to further the criminal enterprise.31 No federal statute ex­
plicitly prescribes a mens rea for conspiracy. The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that, based on the Model Penal Code, the appropri­
ate mens rea is intent to further the aims of the conspiracy.32 Accord­
ing to the Model Penal Code, a person is guilty of conspiracy if, with 
the purpose of promoting the commission of a crime, he agrees with 
another person to engage in such conduct as constitutes a crime, or 
agrees to help another person plan or commit a crime.33 
Id. (citing R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 776 (2d ed. 1968)). 
27. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 203. 
28. See id. at 204-05. 
29. For instance, while the Second and Ninth Circuits both apply similar evidentiary re­
quirements for permitting a deliberate ignorance instruction, the Ninth Circuit maintains 
that the deliberate ignorance doctrine should be used only rarely, where the Second Circuit 
uses it more freely. 
Other circuits have employed deliberate ignorance doctrines without reference to sec­
tion 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code. For instance, the Tenth Circuit rejected including sec­
tion 2.02(7) as part of its deliberate ignorance instruction and has developed evidentiary 
standards for a finding of deliberate ignorance that differ from those of the Second and 
Ninth Circuit. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2232. 
30. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985). 
31. See, e.g. , Christine L. Chinni, Criminal Law - Whose Head ls in the Sand? Problems 
with the Use of the Ostrich Instruction in Conspiracy Cases, 13 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 35, 41 
(1991) (citing Fridman, Mens Rea in Conspiracy, 19 Moo. L. REV. 276 (1956)); Albert J. 
Hamo, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624 (1941)). 
32. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951); Fridman, supra note 31. 
33. The Model Penal Code states: 
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the 
purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (a) agrees with such other person or 
persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such crime 
or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (b) agrees to aid such other person or 
persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to com­
mit such crime. 
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The prosecution must meet two burdens in a conspiracy case. First, 
it must establish that the defendant knew of the unlawful goals of the 
conspiracy. Second, it must establish that the defendant had the pur­
pose or intent to further its goals, and thus intended to be member of 
the conspiracy.34 The Model Penal Code equates intent with purpose.35 
Because most federal courts allow the ostrich instruction in conspiracy 
cases to prove the first element,36 commentators have raised concerns 
that confused juries could parlay deliberate ignorance into the second 
element and convict the defendant on a lesser mens rea.37 They worry 
that juries will convict the defendant on a finding of knowledge rather 
than purpose. 
Courts have taken varying approaches to this problem, some much 
more liberal than others. One approach is to allow the prosecution to 
use deliberate ignorance to establish the defendant's knowledge of the 
unlawful goals of the conspiracy, but not to establish that the defen­
dant intended to further the goals of the conspiracy. Courts using this 
approach argue that the element of intent to further the goals of a 
conspiracy requires specific intent, and thus requires proof of purpose, 
as well as knowledge.38 Because deliberate ignorance is sufficient only 
as to knowledge, these courts reason that deliberate ignorance is insuf­
ficient to establish this latter element of conspiracy. In Ferranini,39 the 
appellants challenged jury instructions explaining the applicability of 
conscious avoidance to a conspiracy charge. The court had instructed 
the jury that 
they could find a defendant to have known a particular fact if the evi­
dence showed "beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant. .. was 
aware that there was a high probability of a fact, but deliberately and 
consciously avoided confirming this fact." The court also instructed the 
jury ... that, as to the conspiracy count, it could find a defendant to have 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03. 
34. For instance, if someone gives the defendant a package of cocaine, and if the defen­
dant agrees to take the package across the border of the United States and Mexico for a 
large sum of cash, then it is clear that the defendant intended to further the goals of the con­
spiracy (smuggling cocaine across the border) as evidenced by his commission of the overt 
act (traveling across the border with the package). 
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § l.13(12). 
36. See United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Inv. En­
ters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1993). 
37. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 41-42 (explaining that the drafters of the Model Penal 
Code noted a meaningful difference between knowledge and purpose: "Knowledge that the 
requisite external circumstances exist is a common element in both conceptions. But action 
is not purposive with respect to the nature or result of the actor's conduct unless it was his 
conscious object to perform an action of that nature or to cause such a result."); see also 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary at 223. 
38. See Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145. This Note will refer to this approach as the "strict com­
pliance" approach. 
39. Id. 
November 2001] Deliberate Ignorance in Conspiracy Cases 479 
known of the unlawful object of the conspiracy - a requisite finding to 
sustain a conspiracy conviction - if it found the defendant to have "de­
liberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious."40 
The circuit court found that the lower court's instructions were ap­
propriate because they permitted the jury to consider conscious avoid­
ance to support a finding with respect of knowledge of the conspir­
acy's unlawful goals, but did not permit the jury to consider conscious 
avoidance to support a finding of the defendant's knowing participa­
tion or membership in the conspiracy.41 Consequently, the Second Cir­
cuit promotes a strict compliance approach in applying the deliberate 
ignorance instruction. The instruction is only appropriate when the 
prosecutor offers evidence of deliberate ignorance to show knowledge, 
but not purpose. 
Supporters of an alternate approach, however, argue that if the 
prosecution can establish that the defendant knew of the unlawful 
purpose of the conspiracy by proving deliberate ignorance, it follows 
that the defendant must have intended to further the conspiracy's 
purpose because he participated in the conspiracy.42 For instance, in 
United States. v. Investment Enterprises, Inc.,43 the defendant was 
charged with conspiracy to ship obscene videos interstate. The Fifth 
Circuit ruled that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that 
the defendant knew of the unlawful aims of the conspiracy. His par­
ticipation was evidence of his intent to further its purpose. In other 
words, this approach allows the jury to connect logically the two ele­
ments of conspiracy. This "logic approach" permits the jury to use 
proof of deliberate ignorance to establish both knowledge of the un­
lawful aims of a conspiracy and intent to further the goals of the con­
spiracy: If the defendant knew of the unlawful goals of the conspiracy, 
it follows that he intended to further the goals of the conspiracy as 
evidenced by his action. 
A third approach, taken by the Tenth Circuit, is perhaps the most 
conservative of the three. Courts adopting this approach assert that a 
"deliberate ignorance" instruction is appropriate in conspiracy cases 
only when a defendant denies knowledge of a relevant fact, and when 
the evidence shows that the defendant engaged in deliberate acts to 
avoid knowledge of that operant fact.44 In other words, the court may 
40. Id. at 154. 
41. See id. 
42. This Note will refer to this approach, adopted by the Fifth Circuit, as the "logic" ap­
proach. 
43. 10 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1993). 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Delreal-Ordones, 213 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 2000). In this 
case, the defendant was prosecuted for possession with the intent to distribute methamphet­
amine. An agent noticed that the defendant had purchased a one-way ticket on a train from 
California to Kansas with cash, and observed the defendant with a black suitcase in the stor­
age compartment. Upon being asked by the agent if his luggage could be searched, defen-
480 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:473 
tender a deliberate ignorance instruction only when the government 
presents evidence that the defendant took deliberate and unequivocal 
acts to avoid knowledge in order to have a defense in the event of 
prosecution. The purpose of the instruction is to alert the jury that the 
act of avoidance could be motivated by sufficient guilty knowledge to 
satisfy the knowing element.45 
This Note argues that the presently used approaches to a deliber­
ate ignorance instruction in conspiracy cases are unsatisfactory. It fur­
ther proposes an approach that allows the jury to use deliberate igno­
rance to establish purpose if there is evidence that the defendant has 
taken deliberate steps to avoid knowledge. Part I argues that deliber­
ate ignorance is an appropriate substitute for knowledge. It also ad­
dresses concerns that juries will confuse deliberate ignorance with 
negligence or recklessness and thus convict on an inappropriate mens 
rea. Part II examines the Second Circuit's strict compliance approach 
and the Fifth Circuit's logic approach and concludes that neither is 
satisfactory. It asserts that the strict compliance approach is too strict 
in its allowance of the use of deliberate ignorance in conspiracy cases. 
Part II further argues that the logic approach is inadequate because it 
overlooks the mens rea requirements of conspiracy and the corre­
spondence principle.46 Part III proposes an alternate approach which is 
a variation of the Tenth Circuit's approach, by which the prosecution 
may use deliberate ignorance to establish purpose in conspiracy cases 
,if the defendant has taken deliberate acts to avoid knowledge of his 
membership in a conspiracy. This Note concludes that this hybrid ap­
proach is the best way for the courts to consider deliberate ignorance 
in conspiracy cases because it does not confuse knowledge with reck­
lessness and it requires unequivocal acts to prove deliberate igno­
rance. 
dant agreed and the agent discovered bundles of methamphetamine in a detergent box. De­
fendant said he did not know how the drugs got into his suitcase, but that his friends had 
packed his suitcase for him and must have included the box of detergent. Prosecutors argued 
that the defendant must have known the drugs were in the box because when the defendant 
discovered on his train ride that detergent had been leaking on him, rather than throwing 
away the box, he simply cleaned it up. See also Marcus, supra note 14, at 2250. 
45. See, e.g. , Delreal-Ordones v. United States, 531 U.S. 915 (2000). 
46. The correspondence principle is the principle of criminal law which states that each 
element of a crime has a corresponding mens rea (purpose, knowledge, recklessness or neg­
ligence) that the prosecution must prove to establish the defendant's guilt. See Kenneth W. 
Simons, When Is Strict Liability lust?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1075, 1087 (1997); 
Jeremy Horder, A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law, 1995 CRIM. L. 
REV. 759. The Fifth Circuit's approach ignores this principle by allowing deliberate igno­
rance (knowledge) to establish part I and thus part II of a conspiracy charge, whereas the 
statute requires more than knowledge (purpose) to establish this second part. 
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I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND DELIBERATE 
IGNORANCE 
Generally, courts and commentators agree that the mental state of 
deliberate ignorance is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of knowl­
edge.47 But there are also several vocal opponents of this proposition. 
Whether and under what circumstances defendants with this mental 
state should be held liable for acting knowingly constitutes "the prob­
lem of willful ignorance."48 Section I.A argues that deliberate igno­
rance is an appropriate substitute for knowledge as a mens rea in the 
crime of conspiracy. Section I.B refutes oft-raised concerns that the 
jury will mistake deliberate ignorance for negligence, thus convicting a 
defendant on a lesser mens rea than that which is required by statute. 
A. Deliberate Ignorance as a Substitute for Knowledge 
This Section attempts to trace the origin of the concept of deliber­
ate ignorance, and to explain how it sprung from the definition of 
knowledge. Next, this section explains the importance of equating de­
liberate ignorance with knowledge in conspiracy cases. Finally, this 
section refutes some of the concerns commentators have raised about 
equating deliberate ignorance with knowledge. 
In Jewell, the Ninth Circuit called the mental state possessed by the 
defendant willful ignorance.49 In that case, there was circumstantial 
evidence from which the jury could infer that the appellant had posi­
tive knowledge of the presence of the marijuana. There was also evi­
dence from which the jury could conclude that the appellant was truth­
ful when he said that although the appellant knew of the secret 
compartment and had knowledge of facts indicating it contained 
marijuana, he deliberately avoided positive knowledge of the presence 
of the contraband to avoid responsibility in the event of discovery.50 If 
the jury concluded the latter was indeed the situation, and if the law 
required positive knowledge for a conviction, the jury had no choice 
but to find the appellant not guilty even though he deliberately con­
trived his lack of positive knowledge.51 
With their definition of knowledge, the drafters of the Model Pe­
nal Code sought to develop a concept of knowledge that 'enables 
47. E.g., Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 33-34 (1994) (proposing in general that 
the mental state found in Jewell is either a kind of knowledge or the moral equivalent of 
knowledge, and as such, it is plausible to hold such a defendant liable for violating a statute 
that requires that he act knowingly). 
48. Id. at 34. 
49. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane). 
50. See Jewell, 532 F.2d at 699. 
51. See id. 
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courts to convict defendants for acting deliberately ignorant.52 The 
Model Penal Code states that a person acts knowingly with respect to 
a material element of an offense when, if the element involves the na­
ture of his conduct or attendant circumstances, "he is aware that his 
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist."53 The 
Model Penal Code goes on to explain that the requirement of knowl­
edge can be satisfied by a something less than knowledge with cer­
tainty: "When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an 
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is 
aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes 
that it does not exist. "54 
The courts created the concept of deliberate ignorance to describe 
the culpable mental state found in cases like Jewell. The objective of 
the courts is to convict a defendant who may lack genuine knowledge 
and otherwise might be acquitted for acting knowingly, primarily be­
cause morally he is as culpable as someone who acted with actual 
knowledge.55 Courts accomplish this by describing a mental state that 
is not a kind of knowledge, but can plausibly be construed as the 
moral equivalent of knowledge - willful ignorance.56 The Jewell court 
explained the broad definition of knowledge the Model Penal Code 
provides by explaining that knowledge cannot be limited to positive 
knowledge because such an interpretation would make deliberate ig­
norance a defense.57 
Although the Supreme Court has approved the Model Penal 
Code's definition of deliberate ignorance, this definition is too vague. 
The primary problem is the confusion between whether the Model 
Penal Code treats the willfully ignorant defendant as possessing 
genuine knowledge, or a substitute for knowledge.58 It seems relatively 
52. See Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 36. 
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b )(i) (1985). 
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7). 
55. But see Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1351 (1992) (disagreeing with this proposition). Charlow argues that a person who is 
certain that his conduct is criminal is more culpable than one who is only aware with a high 
probability that that is the case. In sum, she claims that the certain actor is more dangerous 
because he is less deterrable insofar as he has shown his willingness to violate the Jaw. Sec­
ondly, she points out that the certain actor is more callous in his disregard for the law. 
56. See Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 36. 
57. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. The Ninth Circuit explained that the substantive justification 
for the [deliberate ignorance] rule is that deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are 
equally culpable. The textual justification is that in common understanding one "knows" a 
fact of which he is less than absolutely certain. To act "knowingly" therefore, is not neces­
sarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with awareness of the high prob­
ability of the existence of the fact in question. When such awareness is present, "positive" 
knowledge is not required. 
58. See Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 43. Husak and Callender contrast the two 
views about the relationship between willful ignorance and knowledge: that is, whether will-
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clear that deliberate ignorance is not genuine knowledge, otherwise it 
would be unnecessary to distinguish the concept of deliberate igno­
rance. The jury instructions in Jewell predicated liability on a particu­
lar explanation of why the defendant remained ignorant, not on a 
finding of knowledge. Logically, ignorance cannot be genuine knowl­
edge.59 Deliberate ignorance is not genuine knowledge. Rather, delib­
erate ignorance is something close to positive knowledge, without the 
defendant's actually knowing the fact is certainly true. 
Nevertheless, deliberate ignorance is the moral equivalent of 
genuine knowledge.60 The Model Penal Code states that knowledge of 
a fact is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its exis­
tence, unless he actually believes it does not exist.61 Thus one can be 
aware of a high probability that Fact X exists, but deliberately remain 
ignorant of that fact, or one can be aware of a high probability that 
Fact X exists, and actually know that it does. In both cases, the defen­
dants are equally culpable because they were either aware of a high 
probability of X, or knew X - both satisfy the Model Penal Code's 
definition of knowledge. 
The primary purpose of equating deliberate ignorance with knowl­
edge, and of giving a jury instruction based on this equation, is to pre­
vent a guilty defendant from escaping punishment by deliberately 
avoiding knowledge of some key facts.62 The notion is that the defen­
dant is in fact guilty, and his ability to determine the facts which he 
should avoid confirming as true demonstrates that he did in fact pos­
sess the required knowledge, or level of culpability to be guilty of 
knowledge.63 The ostrich instruction "allows the jury to impute knowl­
edge to (a defendant) of what should be obvious to him if it found, be­
yond a reasonable doubt, a conscious purpose to avoid enlighten­
ment."64 Finding deliberate ignorance could be said to require an 
inquiry into the motive of the defendant. If the defendant intentionally 
remained ignorant of Fact X because he was aware of a high probabil­
ity that Fact X was true, then he is just as culpable as the defendant 
ful ignorance is genuine knowledge or a substitute for knowledge. Either of these two views, 
they argue, provides a basis to allow the willfully ignorant defendant to be held liable for 
violating a statute that requires that he act knowingly, although only those who embrace the 
"substitute for knowledge" interpretation need to provide a further reason to defend the 
justice of their result. See id. at 42. 
59. Id. at 52 ("A particular explanation of why a defendant remains ignorant might jus­
tify treating him as though he had knowledge, but it cannot, through some mysterious al­
chemy, convert ignorance into knowledge."). 
· 60. See id. at 36. 
61. See supra note 14. 
62. See United States v. Rothrock, 806 F.2d 318, 323 (1st Cir. 1986); MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02 commentary passim (1985). 
63. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 49. 
64. United States v. Zimmerman, 832 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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who had genuine knowledge.65 The ignorance of the deliberately igno­
rant defendant is deliberate precisely because he is all too aware of the 
existence of the offense.66 As such, it would be unfair to allow one to 
use deliberate ignorance as a defense when the motive for his deliber­
ate ignorance was his awareness of the existence of the offense - the 
high probability of its existence. 
Not all commentators, however, agree with this proposition. Some 
argue that deliberate ignorance is merely recklessness, explaining that 
recklessness is conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk.67 Conscious disregard, they assert, requires that the actor actually 
have recognized a particular risk; it applies to a conscious disregard of 
the likelihood of any material element of a crime.68 Recklessness de­
scribes a willingness to act in the face of a perceived probability of the 
existence or creation of a particular fact.69 
Knowledge, critics explain, is really an awareness of the existence 
of a particular fact, not an awareness of a high probability of its exis­
tence, as the Model Penal Code states.70 Thus knowledge requires an 
awareness of the acUial, certain existence of a fact rather than recogni­
tion of its probability.71 According to these critics, the difference be­
tween knowledge and recklessness rests in the qualitative difference 
between probability and certainty: recklessness describes recognition 
of a probability, while knowledge requires certainty.72 These critics 
object to equating deliberate ignorance with knowledge because in or­
der to establish that the deliberately ignorant defendant was guilty of 
knowledge, the prosecutor must establish that the defendant was cer­
tain that a fact existed and deliberately avoided confirming it.73 This is 
impossible, they argue, because the defendant cannot be certain of a 
fact and be ignorant of it at the same time.74 On the other hand, if the 
65. Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 41.  
66. Id. at 58. 
67. See, e.g. , Robbins. supra note 4; see also GRANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 96 (2d ed. 1983) (stating that recklessness usually involves conscious and 
unreasonably risk-taking, "either as to the possibility that a particular undesirable circum­
stance exists or as to the possibility that some evil will come to pass"). 
68. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 3, at 236 (1985). 
69. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 221-22. 
70. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7); Robbins, supra note 4, at 222. 
71. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 222; see also G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 124 (2d ed., 1983); Charlow, supra note 55. 
72. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 222; see also Williams, supra note 71, at 125. 
73. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 222. Robbins argues that the provision of the Model 
Penal Code defining knowledge was designed to eliminate the defense of deliberate igno­
rance, and that the high probability language in the Model Penal Code indicates reckless­
ness. 
74. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 222; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 3, 
at 236 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985); Charlow, supra note 55. 
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defendant believed there was only a probability that the fact existed 
and deliberately avoided confirming it, he is only guilty of reckless­
ness, and not knowledge. In that case, they argue that deliberate igno­
rance cannot be a substitute for knowledge, but only for recklessness. 
Several significant differences between knowledge and reckless­
ness weaken arguments that deliberate ignorance is a substitute for 
recklessness and not knowledge. First, there is a difference in levels of 
culpability regarding defendants who act with knowledge and defen­
dants who act with recklessness. The deliberately ignorant defendant 
is as culpable as the defendant who possesses positive knowledge, be­
cause in both cases, there is at least an awareness of a high probability 
of the existence of the fact. Critics are really attacking the "level" of 
knowledge required by the defendant, arguing that unless defendants 
know a fact to be true to a certainty, then they do not possess "knowl­
edge." But deliberate ignorance is the perfect instance in which a de­
fendant who does not possess actual knowledge but rather construc­
tive knowledge is as culpable as the defendant who possesses actual 
knowledge. The deliberately ignorant defendant remains deliberately 
ignorant because he knows the fact is true, but does not want to con­
firm its truth. As such, this defendant is as culpable as the defendant 
who has actual knowledge. Thus the Model Penal Code's alternate 
definition of knowledge, which only requires knowledge of a high 
probability of the existence of a fact, accommodates specifically those 
defendants who act with deliberate ignorance, and thus is appropriate. 
Furthermore, recklessness involves assessing the social utility of 
the conduct by balancing the justifiability of an act against the risk of 
harm, while knowledge requires no such balancing.75 In other words, 
to find recklessness, the jury must balance justifiability with risk and 
harm. If the justifiability of the act is low, the defendant's necessary 
awareness of the risk and harm of the act must also be low to complete 
the balancing. The level of awareness for knowledge, on the other 
hand, does not depend on the level of social utility or risk or harm, but 
rather is an independent fact.76 That the defendant must be aware of a 
high probability of the existence of a particular fact is always a specific 
level of awareness, regardless of other factors involved. So a high de­
gree of certainty determines knowledge, and establishing deliberate 
ignorance is not impossible. It does not require establishing actual 
75. WAYNE R. LEFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(f) at 239 (2d 
ed. 1986). As one commentator explained: 
Where the act in question has little or no social utility, recklessness may require a far lower 
degree of awareness than does Section 2.02(7). Indeed, 'if there is no social utility in doing 
what he is doing, one might be reckless though the chances of harm are something less than 
one percent.' By contrast, 'high probability' entails well over a 51 percent chance of harm. 
Marcus, supra note 14, at 2239-40. 
76. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2239. 
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knowledge and ignorance at the same time, as some commentators 
have asserted.77 
In sum, a defendant is deliberately ignorant of Fact X if he believes 
there is a high probability that X is true, be he decides not to investi­
gate to determine whether X is true and has a conscious desire to re­
main ignorant of whether Xis true in order to claim ignorance as a de­
fense and escape liability.7s Because the defendant is aware of a high 
probability that Fact X is true, the mental state present in the defen­
dant is the moral equivalent of knowledge, but not positive knowledge 
or certainty.79 
B. Potential Problems with Jury Confusion 
Critics warn that without explaining the requirement of a specific 
level of awareness, a jury can interpret deliberate ignorance to mean 
that the defendant can be convicted because he should have known 
the fact, instead of convicting the defendant because he was aware of 
the high probability of the existence of the fact and deliberately chose 
not to investigate in an effort to avoid liability. Thus, critics worry that 
a jury will convict a defendant merely on a showing of recklessness or 
negligence, rather than knowledge established by deliberate igno­
rance. The jury should not punish the defendant, they warn, because 
he deliberately avoided learning of a fact, but only because he knew 
the fact, or was aware of the high probability of its existence.so The 
culpable behavior was his knowledge, not his failure to investigate. In 
addition, to convict the defendant because he should have known the 
fact is to convict on a negligence standard. Convicting on a negligence 
standard requires the jury to argue that a reasonable person would 
have known the fact, and thus the defendant should have known the 
fact.SI 
These concerns about jury confusion are unwarranted and can be 
overcome in two ways. First, even accepting the proposition that de­
liberate ignorance and knowledge are equivalent mens reas, a precise 
definition of deliberate ignorance would eliminate the risk of a jury's 
confusing the mental states of deliberate ignorance and recklessness 
and thus convicting on a lesser mens rea. This would address concerns 
of opponents of the very concept of deliberate ignorance, who argue 
juries should not receive deliberate ignorance instructions because 
they could unwittingly employ a negligence standard, thereby con-
77. See id. at 225. See generally Charlow, supra note 55. 
78. See Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 41-42. 
79. See id. 
80. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2247-48. 
81. See id. at 2248. 
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victing a defendant on the impermissible and inapplicable grounds 
that he should have known an illegal act was taking place.82 
Another potential solution to this dilemma, in an effort to protect 
defendants, lies in the jury instructions, where the court must be spe­
cific in its explanation of deliberate ignorance, and perhaps even con­
trast it explicitly with negligence and recklessness. Unlike the negli­
gent defendant, who is unaware of a proposition that a reasonable 
person would have known to be true, the willfully ignorant defendant 
is not totally oblivious to the truth of that proposition. Rather, the 
willfully ignorant defendant is aware of a high probability of its exis­
tence.83 Similarly, unlike the reckless defendant, who is aware of the 
possibility of risk and disregards it, a defendant with knowledge does 
not engage in any type of conscious disregard, but rather is aware of 
high probability of a certain fact, well over the level of awareness nec­
essary for recklessness.84 Explaining these differences to the jury could 
alleviate any confusion. 
In sum, courts can alleviate the concerns that juries' jobs are hard 
enough without including a deliberate ignorance instruction with ease 
in primarily two ways. First, courts must pinpoint a precise definition 
of deliberate ignorance in an effort to provide more specificity with 
respect to the mental state of the defendant; as a result, the jury will 
be less likely to confuse the mental state of deliberate ignorance with 
the mental state of recklessness. Secondly, a simple instruction clearly 
outlining the differences between deliberate ignorance on one hand 
and negligence and recklessness on the other should clear up any po­
tential jury confusion as well. 
�I. FLAWS OF THE SECOND AND FIFTH CIRCUIT APPROACHES 
The federal circuits take various approaches to the problem of de­
liberate ignorance in conspiracy cases, but the current approaches are 
flawed and fail to hold guilty defendants accountable. This Part ex­
plains why neither the Second nor Fifth Circuits' approaches are satis­
factory. Section II.A describes the Second Circuit's approach, the 
strict compliance approach, and argues that it is too strict in its allow­
ance of the use of deliberate ignorance in conspiracy cases. Section 
11.B argues that the Fifth Circuit's logic approach is inadequate be­
cause it is too lenient in its use of deliberate ignorance and ignores the 
mens rea requirements of conspiracy and the correspondence princi­
ple. 
82. See K. O'MALLEY ET AL, FEDERAL JuRY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: 
CRIMINAL § 17.09 (5th ed. 2000); United States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam). 
83. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985). 
84. See id. 
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A. Second Circuit's Approach: A Strict Adherence to the 
Correspondence Principle 
The strict compliance approach to the ostrich instruction, while not 
without merit, is too restrictive in its approach to deliberate ignorance. 
The Second Circuit recognizes the two elements of conspiracy: (1) 
knowledge of the unlawful goals of the conspiracy; and (2) intent to 
further the goals of the conspiracy.85 The Second Circuit has approved 
the use of deliberate ignorance to establish knowledge of the unlawful 
goals of the conspiracy.86 Nonetheless, it argues that conscious avoid­
ance does not support a finding of intent to further the goals of a con­
spiracy, because intent requires a showing of knowledge and purpose, 
and deliberate ignorance is sufficient only as to knowledge.87 
In United States v. Lanza,88 the defendant was accused of conspir­
acy to commit wire fraud. The defendant argued that while he was in­
volved in the group's activities, he believed he was helping to commit 
extortion, not wire fraud. The court reasoned that evidence in Lanza 
indicated that there was no question regarding the defendant's intent 
to further the goals of the conspiracy, as defendant admitted that 
much. The issue was whether defendant had knowledge of the unlaw­
ful goals of the conspiracy. The court ruled that a conscious avoidance 
charge was appropriate vis-a-vis knowledge of the objectives of the 
scheme.89 
The Second Circuit enforced the Lanza ruling in United States v. 
Ferranini, explaining further the conscious avoidance charge, and ex­
pounding on the requirement that a factual predicate exist before the 
instruction may be given.90 A factual predicate exists when the evi­
dence is such that a rational juror may reach the conclusion beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability 
of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming the fact.91 It 
permits a finding of knowledge even where there is no evidence that 
the defendant possessed actual knowledge. The Ferranini court ex­
plained that a conscious avoidance instruction permits a jury to find 
that a defendant had culpable knowledge of a fact when the evidence 
shows that the defendant intentionally avoided confirming the fact.92 
85. United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1022 (2d Cir. 1986). 
86. See, e.g., id. 
87. United States v. Eltatyib, 88 F.3d 157, 170 (2d Cir. 1996). 
88. 790 F.2d at 1017. 
89. Id. at 1023. 
90. See United States v. Ferranini, 219 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2000); see also United States v. 
Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1993) 
91. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d at 458. 
92. Ferranini, 219 F.3d at 154. 
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Like the Lanza court, the court in Ferranini reiterated that the con­
scious avoidance instruction may be given only if the defendant asserts 
the lack of some specific knowledge required for conviction. In sum, 
the Second Circuit held that in cases where the defendant argues only 
that he or she did not know of the conspiracy's unlawful goals, and not 
that he or she did not intend to further the aims of the conspiracy, the 
ostrich instruction is appropriate because only the defendant's knowl­
edge, not purpose/intent, is at issue. And deliberate ignorance is suffi­
cient to establish knowledge. 
But to establish the second element - intent to further the goals 
of the conspiracy - according to the strict compliance approach, evi­
dence of both purpose and knowledge is necessary because the second 
element requires specific intent. Specific intent is "knowingly doing an 
act which the law forbids and purposely intending to violate the law."93 
Conscious avoidance is relevant to the knowledge component of spe­
cific intent, but a finding of conscious avoidance alone could not by it­
self provide the basis for a finding of specific intent as a whole because 
specific intent is comprised of knowledge and purpose. 
Thus, according to the strict compliance approach, because the os­
trich instruction equates deliberate ignorance with knowledge, an 
offense that requires proof of no mental state beyond knowledge is an 
appropriate avenue for the ostrich instruction. In other words, courts 
should use a deliberate ignorance instruction only in connection with 
crimes for which the required mental state is knowledge or some lesser 
mens rea, but not for purpose.94 When the crime charged requires that 
the prosecution prove that the defendant acted with specific intent, a 
carelessly worded ostrich instruction may give the jury the impression 
that the defendant's deliberate ignorance establishes not only guilty 
knowledge but also purpose.95 The Second Circuit explains that the os­
trich instruction confuses the two elements of conspiracy, collapsing 
them into one. This confusion could deprive the defendant of a legiti­
mate defense that the defendant knew of the illegal goals of the con­
spiracy, but was not involved in the conspiracy in any way.96 Thus the 
strict compliance approach does not allow an ostrich instruction when 
the defendant claims he was not involved in the conspiracy. 
93. See United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1 196 (2d Cir. 1989). 
The Model Penal Code says a person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an 
offense: "(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his con­
scious object to engage in the conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the 
element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circum­
stances or he believes or hopes that they exist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985). 
94. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 51 (1991). 
95. See id. at 51 .  
96. See id. at 54. 
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The strict compliance approach is not without merit. It is logical to 
argue that a defendant must know of the conspiracy's unlawful goals 
in order to manifest the intent to further these unlawful objectives.97 If 
only the defendant's knowledge of the unlawful goals of the conspir­
acy is established, the prosecution must still prove that the defendant 
acted with the purpose of furthering the objectives of the conspiracy.98 
If the defendant only asserts that he knew of the unlawful goals of the 
conspiracy but had no connection with the conspiracy, the defendant's 
knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy and its aims is merely 
evidence that would discredit the defendant's defense.99 The defen­
dant's knowledge makes it more likely that he was involved with and 
intended to further the goals of the conspiracy.100 Supporters of the 
Second Circuit's approach argue that such knowledge can buttress an 
inference that the defendant must have been involved in some way 
with the members of the conspiracy in order to acquire the knowledge, 
but this knowledge is not equivalent to intent to further the aims of 
the conspiracy. 101 
This approach is much too restrictive in its allowance of an ostrich 
instruction in conspiracy cases. 102 Deliberate ignorance establishes 
only knowledge according to this approach, and thus the Second Cir­
cuit allows deliberate ignorance to prove only the element of conspir­
acy that requires knowledge, and does not allow it to establish the 
element that requires specific intent, and thus requires purpose.103 
Strict compliance, however, focuses too narrowly on these mens rea 
requirements. It protects a defendant's right to raise the defense of 
noninvolvement: that he did not intend to further the goals of the con­
spiracy, but it "undervalues the potential that a finding of deliberate 
ignorance has for damaging the credibility of the defense of non­
membership in a conspiracy."104 
97. See id. at 53. Proof of a defendant's knowledge or deliberate ignorance does have 
evidentiary value even if the prosecution must also prove that the defendant acted inten­
tionally. If the prosecution shows that the defendant had knowledge (or the equivalent 
thereof) of the conspiracy, it becomes more likely that the defendant was involved with the 
conspiracy and intended to further it. Id. at 52 n.127. 
98. See id. at 53. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
101. See id. at 54 (citing United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984)). 
102. See United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1989). The 
Second Circuit allows for deliberate ignorance to establish the first element of conspiracy, 
but not the second, because the second requires both purpose and knowledge, and deliber­
ate ignorance is sufficient only as to knowledge. 
103. Id. 
104. Chinni, supra note 31, at 56-57. 
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At the very least, this approach deprives the prosecution of the 
opportunity to challenge the defendant's assertion that he was not a 
member of a conspiracy.105 Evidence of deliberate ignorance regarding 
knowledge of the conspiracy's objectives would damage the credibility 
of a defendant who argued that he did not intend to further the goals 
of the conspiracy, and thus argues that he was not a member of a con­
spiracy. In order to avoid the risk that the jury would convict the de­
fendant of conspiracy based only on evidence of his deliberate igno­
rance, the Second Circuit forbids the use of a deliberate ignorance 
instruction altogether when intent to further the goals of the conspir­
acy (i.e. membership in a conspiracy) is at issue.106 In doing so, the 
Second Circuit deprives the prosecution of the opportunity to allow 
deliberate ignorance to damage the credibility of his defense of non­
involvement.107 For instance, in United States v. Diaz, the defendant 
argued that he had no connection with the conspiracy and was not a 
member.108 The strict compliance approach would forbid the use of the 
ostrich instruction, and proof of deliberate ignorance, because mem­
bership is at issue. In cases like Diaz, proof of the defendant's knowl­
edge of the unlawful goals of the conspiracy would tend to discredit 
his defense that he was not involved in the conspiracy. Thus, by pre­
venting the prosecution from introducing such evidence, the court de­
nies it of a useful tool to discredit the defense of non-involvement. 
Although this approach is consistent with the Model Penal Code, 
the ostrich instruction is useful in those cases in which the defendant's 
membership is at issue because the defendant's deliberate ignorance, 
which is the equivalent of knowledge, makes it somewhat more likely 
that he was involved in the conspiracy and intended to further its 
aims.109 While deliberate ignorance in this context is insufficient to es­
tablish positively the specific intent element of conspiracy - intent to 
further the goals of the conspiracy - it might damage the credibility 
of a defense that the defendant did not intend to further these goals. 
105. See id. at 57. 
106. See Mankani, 738 F.2d at 538. Defendants in Mankani were charged with conspir­
acy to possess and distribute hashish. The DEA received notice of the conspiracy's drug 
smuggling operation and began surveying the area, including aurally surveying a hotel room 
where one defendant was staying. The defendant against which the deliberate ignorance in­
struction was used was a tenant in the home located on property where some of the illegal 
activity took place, although she seemed to have no direct involvement with the operation. 
The government argued that the evidence established the defendant's participation in the 
conspiracy or at least proved that she consciously avoided knowledge of the conspiracy. The 
Second Circuit found that a conscious avoidance instruction was inappropriate because, it 
argued, a person cannot consciously avoid participating in a conspiracy and be a member of 
the conspiracy at the same time. 
107. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 56-57. 
108. 864 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1988). 
109. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 61. 
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In conclusion, the Second Circuit's approach, while strictly adher­
ing to the mens rea requirements set forth for a conspiracy charge, is 
too uncompromising in its blanket ban on the ostrich instruction in 
cases in which membership in a conspiracy is at issue. 
B. Fifth Circuit's Approach: An Exercise of L ogical Reasoning 
The Fifth Circuit's approach,110 on the other hand, does account for 
the potential that a finding of deliberate ignorance has for damaging 
the credibility of the defense of non-membership in a conspiracy. The 
Fifth Circuit's approach, however, is much too lenient because it ig­
nores mens rea requirements all together. 
As used by the Fifth Circuit, the term "deliberate ignorance" de­
notes a conscious effort to avoid positive knowledge of a fact that is an 
element of an offense charged. In effect, the defendant chooses to re­
main ignorant so he can plead lack of positive knowledge in the event 
he should be caught.111 The Fifth Circuit maintains that an ostrich in­
struction is properly given when: (1) the facts support an inference 
that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of ille­
gal conduct, and (2) the facts support an inference that the defendant 
purposely contrived to avoid learning of such conduct.112 Unlike the 
Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit tends not to distinguish between de­
liberate ignorance with respect to the two elements of the conspiracy 
charge. It allows the ostrich instruction to establish both knowledge of 
the unlawful goals of the conspiracy and intent to further the goals of 
that conspiracy. 
The first prong of the Fifth Circuit's deliberate ignorance test pro­
tects a defendant from being convicted for what he should have 
known.113 The prosecution may not establish that a defendant had the 
requisite guilty knowledge merely by demonstrating that a reasonable 
person would have been aware of the illegal conduct.1 1 4  The jury may 
not convict the defendant simply because he was foolish, stupid, or 
negligent.1 1 5  The first prong permits a deliberate ignorance instruction 
only when the prosecution presents facts that support an inference 
that the particular defendant subjectively knew his act to be illegal. It 
110. The Fifth Circuit's approach will also be referred to as the "logic approach." 
111 .  See United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1978). 
1 12. Deborah Sprenger, Annotation, Propriety of Instruction of Jury on "Conscious 
A voidance"' of Knowledge of Nature of Substance or Transaction in Prosecution for Posses­
sion or Distribution of Drugs, 109 ALR FED. 710 (2001) (citing United States v. Fierro, 38 
F.3d 761 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
1 13. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d at 952. 
1 14. Id. 
1 15. Id. 
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does not permit such an instruction when the prosecution presents 
facts establishing that a reasonable person would have known the acts 
to be illegal. In this way, the logic approach addresses the concern 
previously discussed that the deliberate ignorance instruction runs the 
risk that the jury will convict on a negligence standard, assessing in­
stead what a reasonable person would have done in the defendant's 
position.116 
The court may only consider the second prong of the Fifth Cir­
cuit's test if the prosecutor is able to establish the first prong. A de­
fendant could not purposely avoid learning of illegal conduct unless he 
was subjectively aware that a high probability of illegal conduct exists. 
Nonetheless, the same evidence that will raise an inference that the 
defendant had actual knowledge of the illegal conduct ordinarily will 
raise the inference that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high 
probability of illegal conduct. Thus, in many cases, the propriety of a 
deliberate ignorance instruction depends upon evidence that the de­
fendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct -
the second prong of the logic approach's deliberate ignorance instruc­
tion.117 Direct or circumstantial evidence may establish the defendant's 
purposeful contrivance to avoid guilty knowledge.118 For instance, 
courts have determined that a defendant's admission of an intent to 
avoid incriminating knowledge establishes the defendant's purposeful 
contrivance to avoid knowledge.119 
The logic approach essentially equates deliberate ignorance with 
knowledge, and then argues that purpose follows logically. In other 
words, to the extent that the instruction is merely a way of allowing 
the jury to conclude that the defendant knew of the unlawful purpose 
of the conspiracy, it is hardly inconsistent with a finding that he in­
tended to further the unlawful goals of the conspiracy with his overt 
acts.120 The Fifth Circuit argues that if the defendant knew of the un­
lawful goals of the conspiracy, it follows that he intended to further 
the unlawful goals of the conspiracy if there is evidence of overt acts in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
1 16. See supra Section I.B. 
1 17. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d at 952. 
1 18. Id. 
1 19. See United States v. Peddle, 821 F.2d 1521, 1523-25 (11th Cir. 1987). 
120. See United States v. Inv. Enters., Inc. , 10 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 1993). The defen­
dant argued that he cannot be deliberately ignorant of the object of the conspiracy and also 
intend to further its purpose as required by the conspiracy charge. The Fifth Circuit ex­
plained that his argument overlooked the fundamental nature of the deliberate ignorance 
instruction, which is to inform the jury that it may consider evidence of the defendant's cha­
rade of ignorance as circumstantial proof of guilty knowledge. Id. (citing Lara-Velasquez, 
919 F.2d at 951). Viewed this way, the deliberate ignorance instruction is a particularized 
circumstantial evidence instruction. 
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The logic approach is too lenient in that it ignores all the mens rea 
requirements established by the Model Penal Code for conspiracy. On 
the surface, this approach appears to argue that if there is evidence 
that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal 
conduct, it follows that he held the specific intent necessary to be 
guilty of intending to further the unlawful goals of the conspiracy. 
However, in making this logic argument, the Fifth Circuit ignores the 
mens rea requirements of conspiracy under the Model Penal Code. It 
allows deliberate ignorance to establish knowledge of the unlawful 
goals of the conspiracy, just as the Second Circuit does. The Fifth Cir­
cuit then argues, however, that purpose is not a necessary element to 
establish the second element of conspiracy because deliberate igno­
rance is sufficient to establish this second element. Thus, the logic ap­
proach does one of two things: it either changes the mens rea require­
ments for the second prong of the conspiracy test from specific intent, 
which would require both knowledge and purpose, or it equates delib­
erate ignorance not only with knowledge, but also with purpose. 
Regardless of which of the above two alternatives accurately de­
scribes the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit, neither is consistent 
with the intent of the Model Penal Code. First, the drafters of the 
Model Penal Code intended a universal application of deliberate igno­
rance, not one limited by the two-prong test instituted by the Fifth 
Circuit. According to the Model Penal Code, "when the issue is 
whether the defendant knew of the existence of a particular fact . . .  it 
is enough that the actor is aware of a high probability of its exis­
tence. "121 No language in the · Code suggests that the definition apply 
only in the limited circumstances where the evidence indicates a con­
scious purpose to avoid the truth.122 The purposeful avoidance re­
quirement does not add to the protection offered to the defendant 
from some of the risks inherent in a deliberate ignorance instruction, 
primarily because liability can be predicated on an omission to learn.123 
The defendant does not have to close his eyes to be liable. He can be 
convicted for failure to investigate. Under the logic approach, aware­
ness of the risk plus omission to learn can establish the purposeful 
avoidance element. This makes awareness of the risk alone sufficient 
for guilt.124 
Under the logic approach, the jury can infer not only knowledge, 
but also purpose from a highly ambiguous omission. An examination 
of the facts of some other Fifth Circuit cases shows that it is frequently 
121. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) explanatory note (1985). 
122. Marcus, supra note 14, at 2238-39. 
123. Alan Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL L. REV. 953, 988 
(1998). 
124. Id. at 989. 
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impossible to conclude that the defendant's failure to investigate was 
due to an affirmative desire or purpose to avoid learning the truth, 
rather than to sheer indifference to learning the truth. 125 For instance, 
in United States v. Investment Enterprises, Inc. , the court held that 
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant 
purposely contrived to avoid knowledge of the illegal conduct.126 As 
evidence of this conclusion, the court pointed to various failures to act 
on the part of the defendant. For example, although the illegal activity 
was taking place across the street from the defendant's workplace, the 
defendant only walked there twice in two years, often sending his sub­
ordinates;127 the defendant never attended board meetings;128 and de­
spite his membership on the board of the company at issue, defendant 
did not involve himself in the sales, marketing or prices strategies of 
the company.129 In sum, the jury concluded that the defendant pur­
posely contrived to avoid knowledge based on a series of omissions, or 
failures to act. In doing so, the jury convicted the defendant of a crime 
requiring proof of both knowledge and purpose with evidence only of 
knowledge at best, and purpose by omission. 
Thus, the logic approach uses the deliberate ignorance instruction 
much too leniently. It confuses purpose and knowledge and allows de­
liberate ignorance to establish purpose. In doing so, the logic approach 
disregards the mens rea requirements for conspiracy as established in 
the Model Penal Code. 
Ill. PROPOSAL FOR THE ADOPTION OF A VARIATION OF THE TENTH 
CIRCUIT'S APPROACH 
This Part proposes alternative criteria for permitting a deliberate 
ignorance instruction similar, but not identical, to that used by the 
Tenth Circuit. It argues for an approach where the prosecution may 
use deliberate ignorance to establish purpose in a conspiracy case if 
the defendant has taken deliberate acts to avoid knowledge of his 
125. See Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946 (deciding that the defendant's failure was not due 
to an affirmative desire or purpose to avoid the truth where the defendant drove a truck con­
taining drugs across the Mexico-U.S. border at the instruction of his cousin without ques­
tioning these instructions or inspecting the truck, but with the knowledge that his uncle has a 
poor reputation). But see. United States v. Inv. Enterprises, 10 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants conspired to transport 
obscene videos in interstate commerce, since the evidence undercut the defendant's position 
that he had no actual knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy and had no intent 
to further it and was sufficient to prove not only that he knew of the unlawful purpose of the 
conspiracy to ship obscene videos interstate, but also that he joined it with the intent to fur­
ther it). 
126. 10 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1994). 
127. Id. at 269. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
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membership in a conspiracy (hereinafter, hybrid approach). By al­
lowing a deliberate ignorance instruction when a defendant takes clear 
and unequivocal steps to avoid knowledge, the Fifth Circuit limits the 
prosecution's ability to establish purpose by omission, as it is almost 
impossible and illogical to prove purpose by omission. Rather, the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving purpose through com­
mission, the defendant's taking purposeful steps to avoid knowledge. 
Because there is some merit to both the strict compliance and logic 
approaches - the former's adhering to the mens rea requirements 
and the latter's argument that employs logic to allow deliberate igno­
rance to prove purpose in conspiracy cases - but also some serious 
flaws,130 the courts must adopt a standard that accounts for these con­
siderations. A variation of the Tenth Circuit's approach would accom­
plish this task. 
Under the Code's conception of deliberate ignorance, evidence of 
an actor's purpose to avoid the truth will be sparse, if not entirely ab­
sent, because a decision not to investigate before participating in the 
conspiracy will involve only an omission.131 The only evidence will 
tend to establish the defendant's participation in the conspiracy: 
1)  evidence that the defendant engaged in a criminal act, and 2) evi­
dence that he possessed a high level of awareness of a fact in ques­
tion.132 The evidence will not distinguish between whether the defen­
dant intended to avoid knowledge of the fact, did not care enough to 
investigate, or knew of the fact.133 For instance, examine the classic ex­
ample of deliberate ignorance. Someone asks defendant to carry a 
suitcase across the U.S./Mexico border and pays defendant a large 
sum of money for doing so. Stopped at customs, the defendant must 
display the contents of his suitcase, and officials find drugs in his pos­
session. The defendant claimed he believed he was carrying only 
clothing across the border. It is almost an impossible task for the 
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
"formed a conscious purpose to avoid the truth"134 but with the ostrich 
instruction and the Model Penal Code's modified definition of knowl­
edge to include awareness of the high probability that the fact in ques­
tion is true, the prosecution does not have to bear such a burden. To 
establish knowledge or the equivalent thereof, and hence deliberate 
ignorance, the prosecution need only prove that the defendant pos-
130. See supra Part II. 
131. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2237 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 9). 
132. See id. at 2237-38. 
133. See id. at 2238. Marcus goes on to explain that the point of MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(7) is that this ambiguity does not matter as long as the evidence indicates that the de­
fendant was aware of a high probability that the fact existed. 
134. Id. 
November 2001) Deliberate Ignorance in Conspiracy Cases 497 
sessed a high level of awareness of a fact in question, but it has no 
burden to establish why the defendant had no actual knowledge of the 
fact in question. 
The Tenth Circuit sought to restrict the deliberate ignorance doc­
trine to the rare case that presents evidence of deliberate and une­
quivocal acts to avoid learning the truth.135 The Tenth Circuit ruled in 
United States v. Francisco-Lopez that courts cannot give a deliberate 
ignorance instruction unless there is sufficient evidence pointing to 
acts by the defendant to avoid knowledge.136 A deliberate ignorance 
instruction is appropriate, the court explained, when a defendant de­
nies knowledge of an operant fact and the evidence, direct or circum­
stantial, shows that the defendant engaged in deliberate acts to avoid 
actual knowledge of that operant fact.137 In other words, the district 
court may tender a deliberate ignorance instruction when the govern­
ment presents evidence that the defendant purposefully contrived to 
avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of 
prosecution.U8 An example of such deliberate or unequivocal acts 
would be if a defendant were sitting in a room with his co­
conspirators, and they began to discuss the success and goals of the 
conspiracy, and defendant stood up and walked out of the room. This 
evidence would tend to indicate that defendant was purposely trying 
to avoid knowledge of the conspiracy - that he was purposely trying 
to remain ignorant, but was aware of a high probability of its exis­
tence. The facts of the case would have to support the inference that 
defendant knew he was involved in a conspiracy, yet intentionally 
closed his eyes to that fact. 
This requirement of deliberate and unequivocal acts is excessive 
given that the prosecution is attempting to use deliberate ignorance to 
establish only knowledge. Court have generally accepted the proposi­
tion that knowledge and deliberate ignorance are equally culpable.139 
Because knowledge can include acknowledgement of a high probabil­
ity that the fact in question is true, the Model Penal Code guidelines 
135. See United States v. Galindo-Torres, No. 91-2020, 1992 WL 14921 (10th Cir. Jan 30, 
1992); see also United States v. Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1991); Marcus, 
supra note 14, at 2251 .  
136. 939 F.2d a t  1411 .  In  this case, the defendant was stopped by  a highway police offi­
cer during a drive from Los Angeles to New York City. One of the officers noticed that the 
rear door vent of the car was held in place by pop rivets rather than the factory-installed 
screws. After the defendant consented to a search of the car, the police officer determined 
that there were hidden compartments in the car's frame containing drugs. Defendant was 
arrested and fifteen kilograms of cocaine were extracted. The defendant denied knowing 
that the drugs were in the car. The prosecution's case was comprised of inferences arising 
from the unusual circumstances under which the defendant came to possess the cocaine. 
137. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2251. 
138. See id. at 2252. 
139. See supra Part I. 
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do not warrant the requirement that the defendant engage in specific 
acts to avoid positive knowledge of the unlawful goals of the conspir­
acy in order to establish the knowledge element alone. 
Requiring proof of unequivocal acts, however, it is not an excessive 
burden if the prosecution is attempting to establish the specific intent 
element of the conspiracy charge. According to the hybrid approach, 
omission is sufficient to establish deliberate ignorance with respect to 
knowing participation in a conspiracy, while commission is necessary 
and sufficient to establish deliberate ignorance with respect to intent 
to further the goals of the conspiracy. Under the hybrid approach, the 
court would require evidence of deliberate and unequivocal acts to 
avoid actual knowledge to capitalize on the merit of the logic ap­
proach taken by the Fifth Circuit, 1 40 thereby allowing the prosecution 
to establish the specific intent required by the second element of a 
conspiracy charge by satisfying both parts of the conspiracy charge 
with deliberate ignorance. In reality, under the hybrid approach, the 
prosecution is only directly establishing the first element of conspiracy 
via deliberate ignorance, and inferring the second. In other words, the 
issue is whether the prosecution establishes knowledge of the unlawful 
goals of the conspiracy with evidence of commission or omission. If 
the prosecution relies on evidence of the defendant's failure to act, as 
the court did in United States v. Francisco-Lopez,141 then deliberate ig­
norance is only sufficient to establish knowledge, and hence the first 
element of the conspiracy charge. 
Under the hybrid approach, suppose the prosecution relies on 
unequivocal acts taken by the defendant that indicate that he inten­
tionally avoided knowledge of these facts but was practically certain 
they were true. In that case, the prosecution can use deliberate igno­
rance to establish not only knowledge, but also purpose, hence prov­
ing the specific intent element of conspiracy. The jury uses the vehicle 
of the Fifth Circuit's logic argument to arrive at establishment of this 
second element of conspiracy. If the defendant had knowledge of the 
unlawful goals of the conspiracy, established by evidence of deliberate 
ignorance proven by commission, and assuming evidence of an overt 
act in furtherance of the conspiracy, then the defendant must have in­
tended to further the goals of the conspiracy. Although no language in 
the Model Penal Code indicates that the definition of deliberate igno­
rance apply only in limited circumstances where the evidence indicates 
a conscious purpose to avoid the truth,142 adopting this narrow defini­
tion would allow courts to use deliberate ignorance to establish the 
140. See supra Section Il.B. 
141. 939 F.2d. at 1405. 
142. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2238-39. Marcus goes on to point out that the Second 
and Ninth Circuits have nonetheless, rather than viewing § 2.02(7) as a standard definition of 
knowledge of a fact, applied it as a limited deliberate ignorance alternative. 
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"purpose" element of conspiracy - intent to further the goals of the 
conspiracy. 
Critics may argue that, according to this approach, the prosecution 
need only establish that the defendant knew of the unlawful goals of 
the conspiracy, and without any further effort by the prosecution, the 
jury is free to infer that the defendant must have intended to further 
the goals of the conspiracy, assuming evidence of an overt act. As the 
logic approach advocates, however, if the prosecutor can prove that 
the defendant had knowledge of the unlawful goals of the conspiracy, 
and that he took overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, it follows 
that he intended to further the goals of the conspiracy.143 If the defen­
dant took deliberate acts purposely to avoid learning of the conspir­
acy, but continued to participate in the conspiracy, then by the tradi­
tional implementation of a deliberate ignorance theory, the 
prosecution can prove that the defendant knew he was in a conspir­
acy.144  By continuing to participate and taking deliberate steps to avoid 
obtaining certain knowledge,145 the prosecution can prove that the de­
fendant purposefully furthered the goals of the conspiracy. The hybrid 
approach uses not deliberate ignorance per se, but rather a variation 
of the mens rea of purpose, just like deliberate ignorance itself is a 
variation of the mens rea of knowledge. 
The hybrid approach also accounts for previously raised concerns 
regarding the jury's confusion of knowledge and negligence. Recall 
from Part I that critics are concerned that unless a court explains the 
requirement of a specific level of awareness, a jury can interpret delib­
erate ignorance to mean that it can convict the defendant because he 
should have known the fact, instead of convicting the defendant be­
cause he was aware of the high probability of the existence of the fact 
and deliberately chose not to investigate in an effort to avoid liability. 
Thus, critics worry that a jury will convict a defendant merely on a 
showing of recklessness or negligence, rather than knowledge estab­
lished by deliberate ignorance.146 To convict the defendant because he 
should have known the fact is to convict on a negligence standard, be­
cause the jury would be arguing that a reasonable person would have 
known the fact, and thus the defendant should have known the fact.147 
143. See United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1978). 
144. See supra Section 11.B. 
145. See, e.g., United States v. Galindo-Torres, No. 91-2020, 1992 WL 14921 (10th Cir. 
Jan. 30, 1992); Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d at 1405. 
146. KEVIN O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: 
CRIMINAL § 17.09 (5th ed. 2000); see also United States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (per curiam); supra Section LB. 
147. As Marcus argues: 
The idea that a defendant is culpable because she avoided knowledge suggests the defendant 
had a duty to obtain that knowledge; the notion of conscious avoidance improperly targets 
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Under the hybrid approach, however, the jury cannot convict a defen­
dant with evidence of failure to act when the law requires evidence of 
purpose because the law would require evidence of unequivocal acts to 
use deliberate ignorance to establish purpose.148 It would no longer be 
sufficient to rely on a defendant's failure to act to establish purpose, as 
the Fifth Circuit logic argument proposes. Rather, evidence of com­
mission would ensure that juries do not convict a defendant for failing 
to act when the prosecution must establish a specific intent to further 
the goals of the conspiracy. Negligence and recklessness are often 
proven by failure to act when one should have,149 but by forcing the 
prosecution to establish purpose by commission, there is a minimal 
risk that the jury will confuse the specific intent necessary to prove 
conspiracy with negligence. 
Furthermore, the hybrid approach addresses the previously raised 
concern that refusing a deliberate ignorance instruction with respect to 
the second element of a conspiracy charge deprives the prosecution of 
the opportunity to challenge the defendant's assertion that he was not 
a member of a conspiracy.150 As previously stated, a defendant's delib­
erate ignorance and the inference of knowledge that it supports can 
cast doubt on his claim that he was not involved in the conspiracy.151 
Evidence of deliberate ignorance regarding knowledge of the conspir­
acy's objectives would damage the credibility of a defendant who ar­
gued that he did not intend to further the goals of the conspiracy, and 
thus argued that he was not a member of a conspiracy. In order to 
avoid the risk that the jury would convict the defendant of conspiracy 
based only on evidence of his deliberate ignorance, the Second Circuit 
has opted to forbid the use of a deliberate ignorance instruction alto­
gether in those cases in which intent to further the goals of the con­
spiracy is at issue.152 In doing so, the Second Circuit deprives the 
prosecution of the opportunity to allow deliberate ignorance to dam­
age the credibility of his defense of non-involvement.153 
the defendant"s alleged failure to investigate as the culpable aspect of her conduct. The 
Model Penal Code, however, protects against conviction under a negligence standard by 
supplying a general definition of knowledge, which requires a finding that the defendant 
possessed a high level of awareness of the critical fact. 
Marcus, supra note 14, at 2248. 
148. It is important to note here that the knowledge element of conspiracy can still be 
established with evidence of omission. Establishing "knowledge" as defined by deliberate 
ignorance requires no special proof of positive, unequivocal acts to avoid actual knowledge. 
149. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985). 
150. See supra, Section II.A; see also Chinni, supra note 31, at 57. 
151. See supra Section II.A. 
152. See United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984). 
153. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 56-57. 
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The hybrid approach considers this tool of the prosecution and al­
lows a deliberate ignorance instruction even when only the defen­
dant's intent to further the goals of the conspiracy is at issue - an in­
struction the Second Circuit currently forbids under its approach. By 
adopting the hybrid approach, the concern that the jury would convict 
the defendant of conspiracy based only on evidence of his deliberate 
ignorance is no longer legitimate, because the prosecutor is not denied 
this opportunity to challenge the defendant's membership in a con­
spiracy. It takes into consideration the idea that deliberate ignorance, 
especially if established by the defendant's action rather than failure 
to act, makes it more likely that he or she was involved in the conspir­
acy and intended to further its aims. And deliberate ignorance evi­
denced by positive acts would be sufficient to establish the defendant's 
guilt if used to establish that he intended to further the goals of the 
conspiracy - in other words, if used to establish his membership in 
the conspiracy. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the current approaches to a deliberate ignorance instruc­
tion in conspiracy cases is satisfactory. The strict compliance approach 
is too strict in its allowance of the use of deliberate ignorance in con­
spiracy cases. This approach ignores some of the merits of the logic 
approach, and it strips the prosecution of the opportunity to address 
the likelihood that the defendant intended to further the goals of the 
conspiracy as evidenced by his deliberately remaining ignorant of cer­
tain facts pertaining to the conspiracy. On the other hand, the logic 
approach is too lenient in its use of deliberate ignorance, and it ignores 
the mens rea requirements of conspiracy and the correspondence 
principle. A hybrid of the strict compliance and logic approaches that 
adheres to the mens rea requirements while taking into account the 
Fifth Circuit's logic argument is a better approach. Courts should 
adopt an approach similar to the one adopted by the Tenth Circuit 
that allows the jury to use deliberate ignorance to establish purpose if 
there is evidence that the defendant has taken purposeful, deliberate 
acts to avoid knowledge. This way, the prosecution may use deliberate 
ignorance to establish purpose in a conspiracy case if the defendant 
has taken deliberate acts to avoid knowledge of his membership in a 
conspiracy. By allowing a deliberate ignorance instruction only in the 
case where a defendant has taken clear and unequivocal steps to avoid 
knowledge, the prosecution will have the burden of proving purpose 
through commission, the defendant's taking purposeful steps to avoid 
knowledge. 
